David Youldon

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About David Youldon

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    Livingstone, Zambia
  1. There is a comprehensive report on GMAs in Zambia here. THE IMPACT OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT POLICIES ON COMMUNITIES AND CONSERVATION IN GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS IN ZAMBIA "the economic, sociological and ecological performance of GMAs ... indicates that not much has been achieved."
  2. My understanding is that the income from photographic tourism for the Sankuyo community is 27% of the total income.
  3. Community income from hunting and tourism can be substantial. e.g. $590,000 ($75 per family) in 2005 for the Sankuyo community in Botswana (Arntzen et al. 2007) and $114,000 ($73 per member) in 2006 for the Nyae Nyae community in Namibia (Jones & Mosimane, 2007). These examples are cited as being in areas of sound governance; not all communities achieve these level of benefits. Arntzen et al. (2007) suggest that the non-material benefits of hunting to communities in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana are more important to communities than the relatively limited material benefits (although it is suggested that even the income levels cited above are either higher than annual earnings from other sources, or form a significant proportion of household income). So, if we assume for the moment that photographic tourism is insufficient in many areas to produce the revenues needed to achieve these levels of benefits (based on competition for tourist dollars from more popular tourism destinations), and that hunting is undesirable, NGOs would have to meet the relatively small cost of the trophy fees (as stated by other posters this can be from $3 - 10,000 or so for a lion), plus any other minimum fees required by the local governing council / headman / wildlife authority, but also have to meet the significant costs of the benefits to the community - so they would realistically then have to pay into the 'fund' the same as a trophy hunter would to an operator I have never heard of anyone adding up the costs of buying out the lion hunting industry, but if we assume $100k per lion needs to be put into the fund, and use the CITES figure of around 750 lions shot per year, you could in theory buy out the industry for $75 million per year. Given that the total NGO expenditure on conservation in sub-Saharan Africa is only around $237 million per year, this would be seen as too higher proportion for one conservation aim. And that is before we get into whether this idea would in fact work or not. Just some very rough figures, but I think reasonable in terms of a first assessment of the concept.
  4. I understand the flight will also go via Harare on its route.
  5. Absolutely agree with previous comments. You cannot beat Ndutu in March for foxes. There are plenty of them and easily seen. They are also very relaxed.
  6. ST'ers might find this paper on THE IMPACT OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT POLICIES ON COMMUNITIES AND CONSERVATION IN GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS IN ZAMBIA (pdf) interesting. The main points raised are: "MESSAGE TO POLICY MAKERS. This report shows that Zambia’s Game Management Areas (GMAs) are in a spiral of degradation economically, sociologically and ecologically – in spite of the unquestionable commitment and efforts of the Zambian Government, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), the communities and their partners. 10 years ago the government implemented the 1998 Zambia Wildlife Act as it realized that without viable natural resources, future generations would face increased risks of hunger and poverty, which would compel them to further exploit their diminishing natural resources. The enacted Policy for National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia instituted the concept of Community-Based Natural Resources Management. Today, it appears that GMA governance through community institutions such as Community Resources Boards and Village Action Groups is failing to achieve the purpose for which GMAs were established; namely to act as buffer zones to National Parks in order to protect wild animals and their habitats to support a viable wildlife-based tourism industry, which contributes significantly to the national economy and to the improvement of welfare in GMAs. Lessons from Zambia and other countries in the region demonstrate that blame must be placed, not with the unequivocal commitment and capacity of the Zambian Government and its partners, but rather with the wildlife management policy itself. This report encourages the Zambian Government to launch a national review of the management of GMAs with the view to design and adopt a new policy framework for wildlife management in the broader context of protected area and natural resources management. This report advises the government to ensure that this policy is drafted prior to modifying the Zambia Wildlife Act so it can influence its content." "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background: Game Management Areas (GMAs) are wildlife estates in communally owned lands in which some wild animals are protected and used primarily for regulated hunting (consumptive tourism) and photographic safaris (nonconsumptive tourism). The 36 GMAs in Zambia cover 22% of the country’s territory equivalent to 170,000 km2. GMAs act as buffer zones for national parks. In the early 1980s, as heavy poaching decimated wildlife populations, new models of conservation with integrated community development emerged. The Zambia Wildlife Act number 12 of 1998 was enacted to enhance the concept of community participation in GMAs. This document examines, as objectively as available data permit, the impact of the current wildlife management policy on the triple bottom line of economy, ecology and community welfare. Commercial Performance of GMAs: Only about 10 of 36 GMAs have photographic tourism developments, and Chiawa and Bangweulu Community Resources Boards (CRBs) are the only recipients of revenue from lodges. Formal employment in the non-consumptive tourism sector remains extremely low. In the Mfuwe area, which is the most active tourist hub in any GMA in Zambia, there were only 700 permanent and temporary staff in 2005. Analysis of utilization of key species (lion, leopard, sable, roan and buffalo) in the hunting packages show declining trends together with the trophy quality for major species. Compared to its neighbors, Zambia has underperformed on generating revenue from hunting. The main reason is the decreasing availability of trophy animals. Consequently, the hunting revenues disbursed by Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to CRBs have declined since 2004. Incomes fell by about K170 million in 2005 and K50 million in 2006. Ecological Performance of GMAs: Quantitative evidence suggests that in more than half of Zambia’s GMAs animal populations have declined, mainly due to poaching, and in some GMAs the animal status is unknown. Many hunting blocks are affected. Kasonso Busanga, Nkala, Mulobezi and West Petauke appear to have degenerated from prime to secondary status, and twelve other GMAs are in a critical state of depletion. A snap survey furthermore shows that the natural habitats available to support wildlife in GMAs is shrinking throughout the country due to increased settlements, cultivation, traditional land claims and uncoordinated planning by government departments. Bilili GMA is the worst affected with almost no land left for wildlife. Sociological Performance of GMAs: GMA communities are characterized by high poverty levels. Monthly per capita expenditure is estimated at ZMK 71,005 compared to ZMK 111,747 for rural areas generally and ZMK 244,352 for urban areas (LCMS, 2006). When compared to other rural communities, the welfare of communities in GMAs is 30% lower than national rural average. A 2006 poverty impact study of nature-based tourism in GMAs found that, on average, households in GMAs gain from living in GMAs, but benefits are captured by the elite and relatively non-poor stratum of the community. The elite capture is supported by audit reports of CRBs in the Kafue National Park system, which pointed to large proportions of funds being spent on travel allowances, accommodation and meeting costs. Factors affecting the Performance of GMAs: The most serious problems across all GMAs are poaching, human encroachment, fire, deforestation, subsistence agriculture and illegal fishing. Food insecurity is high. Very little funding goes to resource protection and only three GMAs (Lupande, Chiawa and Sandwe), meet the minimum requirements for management effectiveness. Some politicians apparently tolerate unlicensed use of resources by local people and discourage wildlife managers from implementing technically correct decisions. Comparative Analysis of CBNRM Programs: Experiences from several Southern African countries show that community-based natural resources management can help reduce poverty if the policy framework is stimulating and if community institutions are effectively organized to participate in natural resources development. Namibian conservancies offer a model of joint ventures between communities and the private sector that may be beneficial in Zambia’s GMAs. Conclusion: This report paints an alarming picture of Zambia’s GMAs in terms of economical, sociological and ecological benefits. Chapter 2 reveals that the commercial flow to and from GMAs probably is decreasing. Chapter 3 illustrates that natural habitats and wildlife are decreasing at an alarming rate in most GMAs. Chapter 4 shows that GMA communities are 30% poorer than the average Zambian rural communities. Chapter 5 demonstrates that 31 out of 36 GMAs fail to meet the requirements for satisfactory management effectiveness. This report concludes that GMAs have failed to fulfill their purpose; namely to act as buffer zones to National Parks in order to protect wild animals and their habitats to support a viable wildlife-based tourism industry, which contributes significantly to the national economy and to the improvement of welfare in GMAs. The key message to the Zambian Government and other policy makers is that current wildlife management policies are inadequate whether evaluated from an ecological, economic or sociological perspective. This report therefore urges them to launch, as rapidly as possible, a review of the governance of GMAs with the view to adopt a new policy for wildlife management prior to the revision of the wildlife legislation." Personally, I don't see how maintaining a failing system can be beneficial to wildlife in Zambia, but on the other hand it is quite apparent that there are insufficient photographic tourists to sustain the existing national park network in Zambia, let alone the GMAs.
  7. Sorry, I way away when the last developments happened and I then forgot to copy the statement here when I returned. Here's a recap of the whole situation... On 26th January 2012 a team comprising Dr Ian Parsons, Lion Encounter Zambia (LEZ), Mukuni Big Five and the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) captured a wild lion that had been designated as a “problem animal” in the Nsongwe area of Livingstone, and therefore was going to be destroyed. The lion was darted and moved to LEZ's secure facility in the Dambwa Forest, located just outside the city of Livingstone. The lion was collared so ALERT set about contacting a variety conservation organizations in an attempt to determine where the lion might have come from. On 3rd February 2012 WildCru researcher Brent Stapelkamp arrived in Livingstone and successfully downloaded the data from the lion’s collar, confirming his identity as “Dynamite”, and his origin as being from the Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe. Dynamite was born in 2002 and was originally in a coalition of seven when he left his natal pride. Over the following years that coalition was reduced to four, and three of those were killed in snares. As the sole remaining member of the coalition he took over the group’s name, Dynamite, with his core area around the Gwayi. He lost his pride tenure in 2011 to two younger males then disappeared, resurfacing in Livingstone on 22nd January 2012. As soon as the lion entered Zambia it became the property of the Republic of Zambia, under the jurisdiction of ZAWA. With the lion’s identity established ALERT contacted both ZAWA and the Zimbabwe Parks & Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWMA) to respectfully request urgent action to resolve what the future for this lion should be. Given that the lion was part of a research effort in Hwange, ZAWA decided to contact ZPWMA in March urging them to consider repatriation of the lion back to Zimbabwe. In May ZPWMA responded requesting further information on the lion, which was provided. This included the back history of the lion as provided by WildCru, health information as provided by Dr Parsons following an examination under sedation, and a letter of recommendation from WildCru that also offered to fund the costs of translocation and post release monitoring. Several areas in Zimbabwe were identified as potential suitable areas for the lion's release. In July ZPWMA sent a team of ecologists to Livingstone to see the lion and prepare reports to inform their decision making process, those reports being filed with ZPWMA upper management in August. ALERT continued to press both ZAWA and ZPWMA to reach a decision on the lion's future, mindful of the fact that we held no jurisdiction over this. In late October ZAWA informed ALERT and Lion Encounter that it was their intention to translocate Dynamite to southern Kafue National Park where post release monitoring would be undertaken by an existing lion conservation team operating in the Park. On 6th November we were informed that ZAWA would be sending a team, including their own vet, to Livingstone the following day to dart the lion for his journey to Kafue. The team arrived as scheduled and thanked Lion Encounter for having financed the capture of the lion and for his care during his time in captivity. The lion was sedated and loaded for his journey. Dr Paula White of the Kafue Lion Project was waiting at the other end to oversee his release. We have since learned that Dynamite died in transit before he reached Kafue National Park, although have not been provided yet with an official report on this. We have every faith that ZAWA did everything possible to safely translocate Dynamite and to save him once things deteriorated. We are saddened beyond words that Dynamite was not able to enjoy his final days in the wilds of Kafue, but believe through co-operation between stakeholders that between them have the authority, access to funding and technical capability, problem animal management does not always need to mean lethal control.
  8. Seriously, they can't just have worked that out surely! Education = better understanding = improved decision making. Education (esp. women) = improved control over reproductive life = smaller families. Education = employable work force = greater investment (including in ecotourism and conservation) = jobs = maximising revenues from wildlife areas to prevent land use change to alternative use. I know I have been highly simplistic here, but education has to be an integral part of conservation planning. Not news!
  9. This post is in no way intended to show support for Seaview Lion Park. From all comments and views I have received from people who have been there, and that I have read on the net, I would agree that the practices there are of huge concern. This is in response specifically to any credibility given to the paper of Luke Hunter et al. as mentioned in the previous two posts Review of Hunter et al. paper “Walking with lions: why there is no role for captive-origin lions Panthera leo in species restoration“ Early in 2012 ALERT was presented with a first version of the above mentioned paper that purported to present an evaluation of the African Lion Rehabilitation & Release into the Wild Program. This was to be achieved despite none of the authors having visited the program, included direct attacks on individuals working for ALERT and was factually inaccurate throughout. Needless to say the paper was not published following an initial peer review. A much revised, more general, version has now been published on-line and ALERT has commissioned an independent peer review to assess the validity of the opinions given. We present here the findings of that review. As an overall statement, we feel that the article, while published in a scientific journal, is no more than an opinion piece. Hunter et al. (2012) seeks to dismiss the need for captive-origin lion restoration programmes. These are rendered as nothing more than commercial tourist attractions adding little to the conservation of the species. In contrast, the authors promote the merits of wild-born lion translocation programmes as sound conservational operations. Unfortunately, the paper fails to marshal a range of evidence to assess either type of species restoration initiative satisfactorily. Rather, the paper delves into an unsubstantiated attack on captive-origin programmes, labelling them as “failures” without recourse to evidence to warrant such claims, nor evaluating the steps involved in such programs to alleviate the suggested failures. It is a shame that in order to endorse wild translocations, the authors feel they must scorn alternative conservation operations, with arguments based on conjecture rather than scientific fact. Hunter et al. begin their attack on captive-born reintroduction operations by noting some actual ‘failed’ reintroduction attempts (lynx and jaguar) and two proposed programmes (tiger and leopard). Two inter-related things are immediately striking here. Firstly, none of these reintroduction programmes concern lions, and secondly none of them concern large social felids. So, to assume captive-origin lion reintroduction programmes are ‘failures’ based on these previous and proposed attempts is speculative in the extreme. These are not equivalent operations. We simply do not have evidence that lion reintroduction programmes, using captive-origin lions are, or will be, failures. Indeed, initial evidence from the release of a captive-bred pride of lions is very encouraging with the lions becoming self-sustaining and successfully raising cubs, meeting the established criteria for success for this stage of the program. We should also consider that past failure is no reason not to try again with a fresh approach, whilst dismissing a program that can enhance the tool-kit of available conservation solutions shows little foresight of where the African lion could well be in a few years time. Secondly, it becomes clear in the paper that one particular organisation is unfairly taken to be representative of captive-origin reintroduction programmes; to suggest that ALERT is representative of the many cub-petting or lion-walking operations that exist around Africa is specious. Certain judgements are made of how ALERT operates, but crucially the paper makes the point that neither ALERT, nor other operations, address the reasons for the decline of lions in-situ without mentioning or evaluating ALERT’s approach and efforts in tackling these important issues. The authors claim that reintroduction efforts are “ad hoc”. On what basis is such an assertion made? Where is the evidence for this? Have they examined the procedures in place in these programmes (and ALERT’s in particular) and found them wanting? If so, they need to present their data and conclusions from such examinations. Interestingly, the authors note that carnivore reintroductions are “profoundly limited by biological, technical, financial and sociological factors”. Unquestioningly, these are fundamental issues which need to be addressed and the decline in lion populations and the possible solutions for this are complex and nuanced. But, how do the authors know these factors have not been, and are not currently being, addressed? Moreover, surely these issues are also relevant to wild-origin lion translocations. How have they been addressed in these kinds of operations? There are points in the current paper where deliberation of these factors seems to be absent from explanations of wild-translocation operations. Surely it would be a stronger argument to explain how these factors have been addressed in wild-origin lion operations than to simply assume captive-origin reintroduction programmes have failed to do so. For example, if wild-born lions are being translocated to an area where numbers have either become vulnerably low, or the population has been wiped out, what measures have been taken to ensure the same reasons for the original loss do not reoccur? Has there been an identification of the issues that led to declining numbers in the first place and have these been effectively tackled before moving more lions in? Anthropogenic factors accounted for all post-release deaths of founders in the case of a reintroduction of lions to Phinda in South Africa, where five lions died in snares and three lions were euthanized after killing a tourist (Hunter et al., 2007). A recent case includes the death in a snare of one of four lions translocated to Liuwa Plains National Park in Zambia (African Parks 2012). This brings us to the issue concerning disease. As the authors note, disease within wild lion populations give rise to concerns with respect to translocations and the threat of transmission of pathogens. Specifically, FIV is endemic within lion populations. Hunter et al. suggest that FIV does not reduce infected lions’ lifespan or quality of life. However, this is based on specific lion populations; namely those lions in the Serengeti and Ngorongoro. As Troyer et al. (2011) note different strains of FIV result in different outcomes for the lion. Those infected with subtype B, the predominant strain found in Serengeti and Ngorongoro lions, do not exhibit the high mortality rates evident in those lions infected with subtypes A and C. They propose that “this could explain the lack of FIV-related pathology in the lions of the Serengeti, where FIV ple-B is the predominant circulating strain” (p. 344). Hunter et al., make no reference to other strains of FIV, especially as regards FIV ple - E, circulating in Botswana, acknowledged to be an especially virulent and dangerous form (McEwan et al., 2008). Hunter et al., refer to the two “catastrophic” CDV outbreaks in the Serengeti (1993-1994) and Ngorongoro Crater (2001) in which particular FIV clades were found to be more susceptible. The effect is dismissed as “marginal”, yet the point remains that it was “statistically significant”. These outbreaks were only 7 years apart and lead to “unprecedented mortality”. Troyer et al. (2011) suggest that although FIV was not considered a major factor in these deaths, there is evidence to suggest different strains within these populations may have played a supportive role as a result of immune suppression. Thus to make assumptions about the effects of FIV on lions in general, based on particular populations, and to judge two outbreaks which occur closely together in time and space as unusual, is dangerous. There is perhaps some doubt in the authors mind about the soundness of such judgements as Hunter et al. retain a wise cautionary note that FIV may, at some point in the future, be shown to be detrimental to lion populations - although many research groups have already acknowledged this (e.g. O'Brien et al., 2012). A solution is proposed to use FIV-negative wild lions, such as those in Etosha National Park. So, the sample of lions being translocated to founder wild populations is actually smaller than first imagined: a point that seems to contradict the emphasis on maintaining genetic diversity within populations and attending to a complex array of factors. There are further concerns when the authors report the presence of bovine tuberculosis in lions. The effect of bTB on lion populations is acknowledged by the authors as “poorly understood”, resulting in 30% of deaths in the inbred Hluhluwe-iMfolozoi population. The primary reason given for not translocating infected lions from southern Africa is due to veterinary restrictions to protect livestock. Where is consideration of the local community’s concerns about their livelihood as well as transmission of bTB across lion populations? This is somewhat alarming. How are the “biological, technical, financial and sociological factors” Hunter et al. accuse captive-origin reintroduction programmes for ignoring, being addressed here? As the authors themselves correctly note, diseases in lion populations are not yet sufficiently understood and yet can cause significant populations decline (e.g. as seen in the Zambezi Valley in 1994/’95). Therefore we cannot resolutely conclude that translocating infected wild lions will not have detrimental effects on lion populations. If we are only to translocate the few unaffected ones, genetic diversity becomes an issue. With respect to attending to genetic diversity within lions, organisations such as ALERT are accused of a lack of attention to genetic detail, creating a “mongrel captive population”, and are further charged with little regard for geographic lineage, further suggesting that lions are selectively bred for their tolerance of close contact with humans. These are claims given no substantiation here. The authors highlight that marked inbreeding depression is known only in two isolated populations arising from extremely few founders: in the Ngorongoro Crater, Tanzania and Hluhluwe-iMfolozi, South Africa. There is no indication of how many populations have been assessed for levels of inbreeding, whilst also failing to mention that the issue of inbreeding is significant in the wild-born lion translocation programmes touted as being such a significant success in lion conservation. (e.g. Trinkel et al., 2010). The authors also offer comment on the behaviours of one of ALERT’s release prides, claiming they exhibit “maladaptive” and “aberrant” behaviours “unknown among cohesive social groups of wild founders”. Firstly, the authors need to provide evidence to show that these are regular occurrences in programmes such as ALERT, and as such form the ‘norm’ for captive-born release prides. Secondly why have known examples of such behaviour in wild lion prides been overlooked here? Thirdly, behaviours such as filial infanticide are not unheard of in wild social species such as hyena (e.g. White, 2005). Hunter et al's paper has one main aim, to discredit the use of captive-origin lions, and in particular ALERT's programmes, as part of species restoration programs. Unfortunately its attempts to do so preclude any detailed and rigorous evaluation of the programmes targeted. The bottom-line is that neither wild-born nor captive-origin translocations can, on their own, resolve the problem in declining lion populations, yet both can play a part in an effective strategy to maintain, and where possible restore viable populations. Point-scoring against other lion conservation programmes is not going to save the African lion. Rigorous assessment and application of a range of effective conservation strategies might, to address those complex “biological, technical, financial and sociological factors”. Genuine attempts to redress the serious decline in wild lion populations are worthy of serious scientific engagement and assessment given the 80 - 90% population decline in lion populations overseen by the status quo of scientists and conservation organizations over recent decades. The translocation of wild-origin lions has, the authors note, boosted lion numbers in certain areas, however such translocations have largely been motivated by tourism and not by conservation objectives. Further, due to poor management at the correct social scale “these populations may be of limited value for the conservation of this species” (Slotow & Hunter, 2009). The decline in lion numbers is a complex problem requiring a range of solutions. The IUCN states: “The reality of the current situation is that it will not be possible to ensure the survival of an increasing number of threatened taxa without effectively using a diverse range of complementary conservation approaches and techniques including, for some taxa, increasing the role and practical use of ex situ techniques. If the decision to bring a taxon under ex situ management is left until extinction is imminent, it is frequently too late to effectively implement, thus risking permanent loss of the taxon.” (IUCN, 2002). The IUCN includes both a Reintroduction and Conservation Breeding Specialist Groups as part of it'sorganization. References African Parks (2012) African Parks Second Quarter Report 2012. African Parks, Johannesburg, South Africa Hunter LTB, White P, Henschel P, Frank L, Burton C, Loveridge A, Balme G, Breitenmoser C, Breitenmoser U (2012) Walking with lions: why there is no role for captive-origin lions Panthera leo in species restoration. Oryx . Available on CJO 2012 doi:10.1017/S0030605312000695 Hunter LTB, Pretorius K, Carlisle lC, Rickelton M, Walker C, Slotow R, Skinner JD (2007). Restoring lions Panthera leo to northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: short-term biological and technical success but equivocal long-term conservation. Oryx, 41 , pp 196-204 doi:10.1017/S003060530700172X IUCN (2002) IUCN Technical Guidelines on the Management of Ex-Situ Populations for Conservation. IUCN. McEwan WA, McMonagle EL, Logan N, Serra RC, Kat P, Vandewoude S, Hosie MJ, Willett BJ (2008) Genetically Divergent Strains of Feline Immunodeficiency Virus from the Domestic Cat (Felis catus) and the African Lion (Panthera leo) Share Usage of CD134 and CXCR4 as Entry Receptors. Journal of Virology 82 (21): pp 10953-8 O'Brien SJ, Troyer JL, Brown MA, Johnson WE, Antunes A, Roelke ME, Pecon-Slattery J (2012) Emerging viruses in the Felidae: shifting paradigms. Viruses 4: pp 236 - 257 Slotow R, Hunter LTB (2009) Reintroduction decisions taken at the incorrect social scale devalue their conservation contribution: The African Lion in South Africa. In: Reintroduction of Top-Order Predators (eds Hayward MW, Somers MJ), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK Trinkel M, Funston P, Hofmeyr M, Hofmeyr D, Dell S, Packer C, Slotow R (2010) Inbreeding and density-dependent population growth in a small, isolated lion population. Animal Conservation 13, pp 374 - 382 Troyer JL, Roelkea ME, Jespersen JM, Baggettb N, Buckley-Beason V, MacNulty D, Craft M, Packer C, Pecon-Slattery J, O’Brien SJ (2011) FIV diversity: FIVPle subtype composition may influence disease outcome in African lions. Veterinary Immunology and Immunopathology, 143, pp 338-346 White PA (2005) Maternal rank is not correlated with cub survival in the spotted hyena, Crocuta crocuta. Behavioral Ecology, 16(3), 606-613
  10. I heard a variation on this. When zebra arrived there was only a black coat, and because he was so full from eating, the coat split when he put it on, creating the pattern.
  11. A team of ecologists from Zimbabwe Parks & Wildlife recently visited Livingstone in order to prepare a report for senior management at Parks on the lion. Oxford University's WildCru have also submitted a report to Parks in support of the lions' repatriation to Zimbabwe suggesting Chizarira National Park as a potential suitable release site. Further they have stated that they "...are able and willing to assist in any way necessary with translocation, release and subsequent monitoring", also offering to cover any costs of the translocation. We are pushing ZPWMA to make a decision on whether to proceed with the relocation for release.
  12. He's in an enclosure, although some people would interchange the word enclosure and cage. It is 3469 sq. metres. No-one is suggesting that this is suitable for his long term welfare, but at least the appropriate governments are now talking so hopefully this can be resolved soon.
  13. Lion Encounter Zambia is financing the care of the lion without compensation from anyone.
  14. Don't listen to rumours Quentin!
  15. Update: We have been informed by ZAWA that they have now made contact with ZPWMA to discuss what they intend to do with this lion.

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